In December 2025, a Dutch car leasing company called Mistergreen went bankrupt, leaving behind more than $200 million in debt and over 4,000 Tesla vehicles. The company’s downfall revealed the danger of putting too much faith, and too much money into big promises about electric cars gaining value and achieving full self-driving capabilities.
Mistergreen began around 2019 with a bold idea: only lease Teslas. The company positioned itself as a pioneer in sustainable mobility, betting that Tesla’s reputation and technology would guarantee success. Most leasing firms spread their business across different car brands to avoid risk, but Mistergreen did the opposite, growing rapidly on the back of one name. Its leaders believed Tesla would dominate the electric vehicle (EV) market and reward their loyalty with rising car values.
A Vision Fueled by Elon Musk’s Words
The company’s strategy was largely inspired by Elon Musk himself. In 2019, Musk claimed that Teslas wouldn’t lose value over time, as most cars do, because they could one day become self-driving robotaxis earning money for their owners. He even suggested Teslas could double or quadruple in value once full autonomy arrived.
Mistergreen’s founders embraced that futuristic vision. They built their financial model around the idea that improvements in Tesla’s self-driving technology would increase the cars’ worth. By 2022, they had expanded their fleet to more than 4,000 Teslas, financed mainly by $150 million in bonds. Investors liked the story: as autonomous technology improved, car values were supposed to stay high or even rise.
Their reports painted a confident picture. Tesla’s vast charging network, the rapid progress of its self-driving features, and the global enthusiasm for EVs all seemed to promise strong future returns. Mistergreen’s entire business depended on those expectations becoming reality.
Market Reality Hits Hard
But by 2023, that dream started to crumble. Tesla faced tough competition from Chinese carmakers offering cheaper EVs, pushing the company to slash its own prices by about 30% for key models. Those cuts made new Teslas cheaper than many used ones, crushing the resale value of Mistergreen’s fleet overnight.
The company’s $200 million in vehicles suddenly became worth far less. While Mistergreen had debts fixed at $150 million plus interest, the falling car prices meant its assets were now only worth an estimated $100 to $120 million. The financial gap was impossible to close.
The disappointment echoed another major EV misstep: the rental giant Hertz. In 2021, Hertz announced plans to buy 100,000 Teslas for $4.2 billion, hoping to ride the EV wave. But by 2024, those cars had lost significant value, leading to a staggering $2.9 billion in losses. Much of that came from write-downs and repair costs, problems Tesla’s delayed robotaxi rollout only made worse.
Elon Musk’s repeated promises of fully autonomous cars failed to materialize year after year. He initially predicted a million robotaxis by 2020, then pushed deadlines to 2023, and later to the end of 2025. Yet, by then, Tesla’s Full Self-Driving system still required human supervision. In June 2025, Tesla launched a small pilot “robotaxi” program in Austin, Texas, but it involved only a few dozen cars, many operating less than half the time.
For leasing companies like Mistergreen, the wait for true autonomy proved costly. The fantasy of appreciating Teslas had collided with the economic reality of depreciation. A Tesla Model 3 that once cost about $51,000 was worth around $20,000 after five years, a drop of more than 60%. Similar declines hit the Model Y.
Lessons for the EV Industry
By late 2025, Mistergreen’s bankruptcy was official. Its cars were sold off at discounted prices, and bondholders faced significant losses. The case became a cautionary tale for the entire EV leasing market, exposing the risks of overdependence on one manufacturer and on speculative promises about future technology.
Other companies took note. Sixt, a major European rental firm, stopped buying Teslas in 2024 and began diversifying its electric fleet with other brands such as BYD, China’s leading EV maker. Ayvens, a merger of ALD Automotive and LeasePlan shifted focus to protecting profit margins and projected that EV prices would likely continue falling over the next several years. Similarly, Arval, another large leasing firm, strengthened its partnership with BYD to balance its portfolio across multiple automakers.
For investors and fleet operators alike, Mistergreen’s downfall marks a turning point. The EV market is still growing, driven by government incentives and global efforts to cut emissions. But the road to profitability in electric mobility is steeper than many expected. Companies now approach the future with more caution, adjusting assumptions about car values and spreading their financial risks across different brands.
True vehicle autonomy remains years away, and until then, the promise of cars that pay for themselves stays out of reach. Mistergreen’s story stands as a reminder that even revolutionary technologies can’t escape the basic rules of business: bets based on hope rather than hard evidence can quickly lead to ruin.
Sources
Tesla rental fleet that bought into Elon Musk’s self-driving lies goes bankrupt due to depreciation. Electrek, Dec 19 2025
Hertz full-year 2024 results. Hertz, Feb 6 2025
Tesla launched Robotaxi service in Austin. Reuters, Jun 2025
CarEdge Tesla depreciation data for Model 3 and Model Y. CarEdge, 2025
Ayvens PowerUp 2026 strategy documents. Ayvens, 2024-2025